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Paul Levy, Mass. Pub. Util. Comm.
Paul Malandrakis, AT&T
Albert Halprin began his presentation with a brief history of
competition in telecommunications. "Above 890" was the key
decision, establishing the principle that private service
networks could be constructed without showing that such service
was unavailable from the existing carriers. The Specialized
Common Carrier decision was also crucial from a historical
perspective, as it authorized a new breed of carriers to provide
service in competition with AT&T. As the price per unit of long
distance service dropped and the price of local service rose, the
response of the telephone companies and the regulators, in a
monopoly environment, was to subsidise local service with long
distance service. Once certain services were opened to
competition, the reponse of AT&T was to establish bulk rates,
through FX service, FTS and the like, for large users who didn't
pay subsidies. These "regulatory bypass systems" necessary in a
competitive environment. This system worked well for 10-15
years, but was knocked down by the courts, which ruled that
subsidies were improper and authorized competition for small
users as well as large users.
Once competition was proscribed for small as well as large
users, the basic question became how much should the long
distance carriers, in competition with AT&T, pay for use of the
local exchange. AT&T argued that the MCI's of the world should
be charged a full subsidy, just as all other small users were
charged.MCI countered that they and other OCC's used local plants
just like the federal government and other large users, and
should therefore be exempt from subsidy payments. Under the "EMPHI!!
agreement, a partial subsidy was charged to MCI and other OCC's.
The FCC then opened the access charge proceeding in order to
determine how access to the local exchange should be charged.
Halprin noted two methods to eliminate subsidies from long
distance to local service. The first was to turn to the states.
However, the state regulators, despite a consensus in the FCC and
Congress, would not accept responsibility for the costs of
accessing the local exchanges. The second alternative was to
recover the subsidy through a flat charge on each customer, which
is of course the path the FCC has followed.
Halprin contended that the access charge proceeding allowed
for the subsidies, which could not be supported in a competitive
environment, to be removed from the costs of local service in a
gradual manner. Several advantages to the gradual approach were
listed: universal service is not threatened through a sudden and
significant rise in rates for local phone service, telephone
companies providing local service are kept viable, large users
are kept on the network, and competition in the provision of long
distance becomes possible.
The two areas of controversy in the access charge proceeding
identified by Halprin are the two dollar charge, which he termed
"political pimping," and the size of the difference between what
AT&T and the OCC's pay for access to the local exchanges. It was
his personal opinion that the first order established the correct
ratio between AT&T and the OCC's, but that the second change was
also satisfactory.
As for the future, Halprin predicted that Congress is not
likely to act on the bills currently before the Legislaturte.
"You can't pass a bill to roll back competition," he said.
Paul Malandrakis, of AT&T Communications, which is the AT&T
entity that will provide long distance in the post-decree enviro-
nment, enumerated four goals of the access charge order: 1) Elimi-
nate undue discrimination, 2) allow efficient use of the local
network, 3) prevent economic bypass, and 4) preserve universal
service. He noted that the subsidies of local service, which
were designed to achieve social objectives, cannot survive in a
competitive field.
The key policy change involved in the access charge
proceeding, he noted, is the replacement of usage charges which
are now traffic sensitive with flat charges. The cost of access
is associated with the local loop, and should properly be charged
at a flat rate. The change is a switch from a social policy to a
market-driven policy.
The access charge does not threaten unversal service, in
Malandrakis' view. The view that some households will be forced
to abandon telephone service due to an increase in rates as a
result of the access charge is unfounded. The universal service
fund, lifeline service and measured rates will all operate to
keep universal service intact.
AT&T does not believe that its users should have to pay a premium
charge for access to the local exchanges.
Malandrakis suggested that AT&T believes that its customers pay
35-45 OCC's for access to the local exchanges under the current
policy.
The third panelist was Paul Levy, a member of the
Massachusetts Public Utilities Commission. His biggest problem
with the access charge decision was "the name," which he
contended has led to misunderstanding of the purposes of the
charge. Overall, Levy expressed support for the concept. The
biggest area of contention with the decision is in the shift of
revenues from local rate-payer supported exchanges to AT&T
communications.
Levy contended that AT&T Communications will now pay $1.5 billion
less for access to the local exchange. If the rationale of the
access decision was revenue real location, Levy argued, then AT&T
should lower long distance rates in the same proportion.
